

danke über das absolute Licht der Vernunft kehrt bei Schelling in anderer Form wieder, und auch Hegel geht im Grund nicht über das hinaus, „was schon im Denken Fichtes und Schellings enthalten war“ (518). Ein Personenregister beschließt den Bd.

F. liefert in seinem Werk eine interessante und originelle Analyse der Probleme der Erkenntnistheorie. Er setzt sich nicht nur mit ihren Hauptrichtungen, sondern auch mit den Grundfragen der syllogistischen Logik auseinander und führt sie zu einer spekulativen metaphysischen Lösung. Sein entscheidender Grundgedanke ist die All-Einheit des absoluten Seins, die jenseits aller Differenzierungen alles umfaßt und von der allein her unsere Erkenntnis befriedigend zu erklären ist. Offen bleibt die Frage, wo F. dieses Sein metaphysisch im Verhältnis zu Gott und der Welt ansiedelt. Aber diese Frage betrifft die Metaphysik und die Religionsphilosophie, zu denen sich F. in anderen Werken geäußert hat.

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POSSIBILITY AND REALITY. *Metaphysics and Reality*. Edited by *Hans Rott* and *Vítězlav Horák* (Studien zur Logik, Sprachphilosophie und Metaphysik; Band 4). Frankfurt am Main [u. a.]: ontos verlag 2003. 299 S., ISBN 3-937202-24-2.

As basic categories of human thinking possibility and reality have exercised a fascination for philosophers as diverse as Aristotle and Bertrand Russell. Indeed, the modal category of possibility has been considered to be the appropriate field of research for philosophy which sets itself the objective of abstracting from the empirical realm to consider what might be the so if such and such a situation were the case. In a world so dedicated to looking for the facts and to seeking out the scientific truth of the actual state of affairs can there be any point to research into what the status of the possible is? This fourth volume of studies on logic, linguistic philosophy and metaphysics, published with contributions in both English and German, sets out to show that across the less and less straight forward divide of analytical and continental philosophy reflection on the nature of possibility and reality is still of contemporary importance. The twelve authors of this volume, originating from the Czech Republic, Slovakia and German speaking countries consider a great variety of topics concerned with questions of possibility and reality from the points of view of the history of philosophy, logic, semantics, philosophical mathematics, literature and scientific and fictional forms of discourse. In all twelve contributions a different facet of the dialectic of possibility and reality is considered and presented in a way in which the specialist logician and the general philosopher can both find a helpful and stimulating account of this age-old philosophical problem.

The helpful introduction to the volume, written by the editors, reviews the history of philosophical reflection on this matter and introduces the reader to the logical and ontological divide which has also at times transferred to the geographical and stylistic divide between continental and analytic philosophy. Should the relation between possibility and reality be considered as ways in which we think or as modes of being, or indeed as both? Can one speak of degrees or modes of being that allow for logical and ontological possibilities between being and not being? Questions such as these provide the framework within which the various contributions to this volume operate and seek to offer some clarification. Following the lead of research in modal principles in both modal logic and analytical ontology the editors note that in coming to a better understanding of the possible one also at the same time comes to a better understanding of the necessary laws which make sense of the possible. However, the editors point out that the chicken and egg relation between possibility and reality is one that still divides metaphysicians and logicians.

The first two contributions to the volume by *Uwe Meixner* and *Markus Hudeck* both use historically important debates in metaphysics to consider contemporary issues. Meixner shows that the ancient concept of necessity already carried with it several different conceptions of necessity of which today only the aspect of form-necessity (nomological necessity) is still a live option. Hudeck, on the other hand takes his historical inspiration from Spinoza's metaphysics of substance and his theory of freedom. Following several contemporary philosophers such as Gilles Deleuze, Yirmiyahu Yovel and Steven Nadler, Hudeck suggests that Spinoza is still an important inspiration for conceiving of

an ethical notion of possible freedom within a system of philosophical immanence. In *Sigmund Bonk's* article the category of time is used to reflect upon the ontological status of the past. In what sense can the past be said to be actual? Borrowing Hans Jonas's understanding of the enduring presence of the past, and Anselm's argument for the necessary existence of God, he suggests that meaningful discussion of the past requires that one admit to the presence of the past in the mind of God. A discussion of the philosophical implications of virtual reality preoccupies *Vítězslav Horák* in his consideration of the ontological status of computer simulations. Following a tradition going back to Plato and drawing on Wittgenstein and Frege, he defends the view that virtual reality should be considered to be an innovative but still basically pictorial category. He further argues that the way in which virtual reality works is not necessarily tied to the representation of reality and thus need not be considered to be true or false. *Jaroslav Peregrin's* paper focuses on the different reasons for which we invent possible worlds in literature, science, philosophy and logic. He looks at the different functions of possible worlds in these domains and concludes by suggesting that the metaphysical claims made by possible worlds should not be used to ground the claims of logic. On the contrary, he argues that it is literary texts and the laws of logic that are the basis of such genres of possible worlds. *Ondrej Majer's* contribution reflects on the important relation between possibility and probability. His discussion points out just how objective, subjective and logical interpretations of probability operate within the framework of possible worlds. Moreover, he shows how the category of possibility goes beyond that of probability. This logically follows from his definition of possibility as the alternative to that which is the case in the world and thus which consequently has to deal with more alternatives in possible worlds. The next three contributions focus in different ways on the question of the representation of metaphysical modalities in formal languages. *Vladimír Svoboda* considers this question by an examination of Pavel Tichý's Transparent Intentional Logic, *František Gabér* by a consideration of the different connotations that the concepts of necessity and possibility have in ordinary language and in the formal language of logic and *Hannes Leigeß* considers the more fundamental question of whether it is possible for metaphysical modalities to be represented by formal languages at all. In *Guido Löhrer's* contribution the focus of attention shifts to Davidson's method of truth in metaphysics. Löhrer argues that it is necessary to modalize the conception of proof to avoid the consequence of omniscience in Davidson's method. The viability of the Turing Test as a means for determining the essence of thinking occupies *Wolfgang Hinzen* in his contribution. He considers the Turing Test to be a functionalist mechanical model of thought that does not correspond to the laws governing the specificity of thinking in the human mind. The final contribution to this volume is by *Hans Rott*. He tackles the difficult issue of distinguishing metaphysical from epistemic necessity in ordinary language conditional statements. As conditionals express variably restricted necessity they thus permit various possible interpretations. Rott reviews a number of rules for interpreting indicative and subjunctive conditionals and concludes that by default subjunctive conditionals refer to restricted metaphysical necessity and indicative conditionals to epistemic necessity. Essentially he understands a subjunctive conditional to be a hypothetical deviation and an indicative conditional to be a factual account of something described in the conditional's antecedent. He concludes by arguing that when the time of the antecedent precedes that of the consequent, we are justified in considering the distinction between metaphysical and epistemic necessity to be a form of belief update. Nevertheless, even this distinction breaks down when conditionals refer to the future.

This volume has as its objective to bring together different approaches to the questions of possibility and reality dealt with in continental metaphysics and analytical logic. As such it is to be welcomed as a contribution to bridging an academic divide that has been and indeed often still is ideological. No less important in this volume is the bridge built through common research carried out between parts of Eastern and Western Europe. One can only hope that more collaborative projects like this will help to break a divide that has isolated Eastern and Western Europe and prevented a real encounter between different research traditions in logic, linguistic philosophy and metaphysics.

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